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Anthropologizing the Citizenship Debate
in Latin America
TON SALMAN
Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam
This article argues that studies and promotion of citizenship falls short if they forget that perceptions and
practices are also informed by culture. Concretely, referring mainly to Chile, Ecuador, and Bolivia, it states
that (mainly poor) people on one hand “subvert” the official canon with regard to citizenship by practicing it
particularisticly and looking for favors rather than “rights,” whereas on the other hand, awareness with re-
gard to rights exists. People’s experiences, however, have taught them, in concrete encounters with state rep-
resentatives, not to insist on their rights but instead to try for the “favor.” Nevertheless, in evaluating such en-
counters with the state, people show that they understand the clue of “universal rules” and the “rule of law”
very well.
Keywords: citizenship; Latin America; personalism; anthropology; urban culture
On his face something in between pretending being shocked and a grin, the
police officer sees the jalopy coming down the one-way street from the wrong
direction. He raises his hand and approaches the car, the window obediently
being opened. The discussion opens through, on one hand, the accusation of
having committed a traffic infraction and, on the other hand, the drivers’argu-
ment that no one-way sign was placed at the other corner, the spot where the
wrongdoing according to the officer had begun. The officer points to the fact
that the new one-way arrangement had been effective for over a month and that
the driver should have noted “that all cars turned off at that spot.” At first, the
driver angrily counters that he cannot be obliged to “know” because the new
rule “had been in place since over a month” and that the argument that “every-
body else turned there” is close to ridiculous as a suggested base for due transit
conduct. But noting that the officer becomes irritated, he lowers his tone.
Then the discussion gets down to the grain, when the officer asks, “And how
are we going to solve this, caballero?” Cutting a long story short, the driver,
promising “to be more careful in the future,” pays the police officer a small
payola, after having driven him two blocks further, because, as the law
enforcement officer remarked, “here people are watching.”
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An indigenous woman renews her carnet, her obligatory identity docu-
ment, that expires every five years. After having waited the normal two hours
queuing, she pays a little more than the official charge for this bureaucratic
routine because the functionary promises that in that case “it will only take 8
days.” After collecting her new carnet, she notices, back home, that her last
name has been spelled wrong. Aware of the fact that this will produce a lot of
trouble in every future bureaucratic action, she returns and queues again, only
to hear that she will have to pay another amount of money to have the error cor-
rected. She protests and claims that the mistake was made by the typist and that
her name was spelled correctly on the application form (which she had to pay
for) and the birth certificate (which she also had to pay for) she handed in. But
the counter clerk remains deaf to her arguments and after some quarrelling
transmits his impatience to the people standing behind her. Because she has no
money with her, she returns home, queues again the next day, pays the amount
requested (without getting a receipt, because, as the clerk explains, “she
already got one the first time”), and receives her carnet seventeen days later,
because the first and second time she went to pick it up, it had not been certified
yet by the official in charge who was “on journey.” She extensively thanks the
clerk when he hands her the document.
Both these stories occurred in La Paz, Bolivia. But they could also have
taken place in Quito, Bogotá, or Lima, or most any place in Latin America.
What do these anecdotes tell us? From the standpoint of a U.S. or European
citizen, the first thing that stands out is that both the driver and the indigenous
woman did not insist on his and her right to be treated justly by state officials.
The driver did not stick to demanding his rights as a driver to be properly
informed about traffic ordinances to evade wrongdoing. In Europe or the
United States, he probably would have won if he had taken the thing to the
police station or, if necessary, to court. But he voluntarily forsook the whole
universe of entitlements to proper information, to being punished only for
“blamable” offences, to being exempt from abusive state functionaries, in
short, to get his right. The indigenous woman did not insist on her rights as
established in the procedures and did not push too hard her obvious entitle-
ment to a free-of-charge correction. She paid for an error she did not commit.
She gave in to the abusive functionary, endured queuing in vain twice, and held
up a polite posture when finally handed her credential.
Although the differences might be gradual rather than total, there seems to
be a greater tendency among Latin Americans to cope with obvious violations
of correct treatment by representatives of the state than there would among
Europeans or inhabitants of the United States or Canada.1 It appears plausible
that a different experience of citizenship is behind this readiness. The problem
becomes most visible in situations as were just described. People, although
strong feelings of indignation and anger might take possession of them during
or after the collision, in the end opt for an alternative, and apparently ignoble,
way out. It looks like they understood, during the course of their encounters
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with instances that ought to endow their rights, that other strategies are more
fruitful. This makes it plausible that their understanding of rights, although the
concomitant official formulations might be similar with those heard in Europe
or the United States, points at different contents for the same term. In this arti-
cle, I concentrate on the Latin American practices of citizenship rather than on
the written versions.
I feel that much of the abundant recent literature on citizenship focuses on
the deficiencies of the system and its institutions and on the alleged absence of
citizenship awareness among the (poor) Latin Americans. Hence, a character-
ization in its own right of what is going on in and among these “noncitizens,”
and in their relations with the political sphere, remains out of sight. The frame-
work is one of a culture in which something is absent, and the study of what is
present is neglected. Missing is the attention for the way in which rank and file
apply, use, and understand the terms in which the citizenship concept is usu-
ally aired. Missing is also a possible plural understanding of the contents and
“sense” of concepts like politics, democracy, and citizenship.2 In a critique on
these approximations, Rosaldo asserted that we “need to understand the way
citizenship is informed by culture, the way that claims to citizenship are rein-
forced or subverted by cultural assumptions and practices.”3
This article aims to contribute to this understanding, focusing on Bolivia,
Ecuador, and Chile.4 Setting out the argument, I suggest that what ordinary
people make of citizenship has two aspects. First of all, there is, in a way, a true
apocryphal side, a series of significations with respect to citizenship that
reflect a lifetime of virtual nonexistence of the classic contents such as individ-
ual sovereignty, equality vis-à-vis the law, respect in treatment irrespective of
family name, appearance and prestige, effective access to public positions,
individual liberties,5 and the like. What people, in such a situation, want from
the system is not the full implementation of these classical contents but a
somewhat better outcome of the mechanisms they actually apply. What they
aim for, for instance, is a little less deceit, lying, and rudeness in the interper-
sonal exchanges with functionaries and “high individuals” and to receive a
somewhat better treatment and outcome. This results in a series of latent as
well as manifest desires that do not reflect classical contents but longed-for
modifications of current practices.
At the same time, however, the notions echoing the official and legitimate
rights attached to citizenship are not completely lacking. They are present in
the minds of the people and influence the ways they formulate their evalua-
tions of unpleasant experiences. People have knowledge of, and mentally
apply, criteria and images about political rights, civil rights, and social rights;6
about “decency” and transparency of the political system and politicians;
about probity and decorum in exchanges with state functionaries or, for
instance, local leaders and brokers. People also know that in many cases, these
criteria are violated. However, they do, in their interaction with these interloc-
utors, not refer to these rights. They know—they have learned—that it is
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counterproductive to try to oblige someone to do something for you or to allow
you something because you have the right. Instead, they prefer to play accord-
ing to the rules of the game, that is, imploring rather than demanding; charm-
ing rather than claiming; “relating” rather than requesting efficient,
anonymous transaction. But in evaluating the state’s treatment and societal
manners, they denounce inequality, impunity, rudeness, political dishonesty,
and their proper right-lessness, and they do so referring to the written, official
citizens’ entitlements. Citizenship appears to be an ambiguous notion.
However, a few conceptual matters need to be dealt with before we can enter
this issue. First of all, the notion of citizenship as discussed in such a context
needs more precision. According to the classical triad by Marshall,7 the (Eng-
lish!) citizen conquered, in the course of history, three types of rights. Civil
rights were born in the eighteenth century. They refer to the rights to individual
freedom, the right to go where one pleases (and thus went against slavery,
bondage, and serfdom), the right to speak one’s mind, to own property, to con-
clude contracts, and most important, to impartial justice. These rights opposed
serfdom, tyranny, censorship, compulsory state religion, and arbitrariness.
The concomitant institutions are the law and the court of justice.
Political rights stem from the nineteenth century. They involve the right to
participate in public, representative institutions, both as voter and as represen-
tative, and the right to associate to defend common interests. These rights
counteracted the absolutist state, institutionalized elitism, restricted suffrage,
and legal exclusion from functions and positions. The concomitant institutions
are parliaments, councils, and other representative bodies.
Social rights are an inheritance from the twentieth century. They enclose the
right to a minimal participation in national wealth and to a standard of living
fitting the national standard. These rights enable the full exercise of the first
two types of right. The situation these rights opposed were the socioeconomic
cleft in society; the estate society; and the lack of real opportunities, chances,
and state care (in education, health care, housing, etc.) for the poor masses.
The institutions that embody these rights are the welfare state and the national
education, housing, and health systems.
Clearly, Marshall’s scheme does not seamlessly fit Latin America’s history
or present. Nevertheless, it serves as a heuristic device to sensitize ourselves
for certain aspects of the (in)existence of rights.8 Also, it formed the basis
under the articulation in recent years of a “fourth dimension” of rights, the col-
lective or ethnic rights.9 Furthermore, it served and still serves as a tool to ana-
lyze where and how these rights have not, or only half-heartedly, or in a
different order, been established.10 Additionally, and more important, in com-
bination with the argument about “deviating” understandings of citizenship, it
makes us realize that there exists a crucial complementary dimension to any
theoretical elaboration of rights or citizenship. The whole issue only makes
sense if and when people have some knowledge and awareness of these rights
and, if necessary, make state institutions, or other actors and resorts, apply
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them. Clearly, warranting these rights in constitutions and legislation, as is the
case in Latin American countries, is not enough or the central issue; and deal-
ing with them only in legalistic or stipulative modes makes the whole thing
clueless. The formal existence of citizens’rights has to be complemented by an
active notion and attitude of being entitled to enjoy these rights or of being
entitled to enjoy a particular form of them. The attitude of citizenship, then,
has to be learned to make it happen—either “righteously” or deviatingly. It
seems to be in this dimension of internalization of a special self-esteem as citi-
zen that the problem can be located.11 As was illustrated at the outset, this
comes to the fore most explicitly in encounters between state functionaries and
the citizen in his condition of state subject.12 It also becomes manifest in the
ways people approach “politics” to obtain certain benefits or simply the
application of official rights.
I will concentrate on the two cases just mentioned: bureaucratic encounters
and the ways the urban poor13 (in Quito, Santiago, and La Paz) approach “poli-
tics” to get things done for their neighborhood.14 This means that I will focus
mainly upon the civil rights—the rights referring to the respect, liberties,
impartial treatment, and equality the citizen is entitled to; and to a lesser degree
upon political rights, particularly the right to participation and influence in the
political realm. As these rights, in Marshall’s view,15 are the foundation for the
other ones (although not their precondition; rather, the three presuppose each
other to be effective), their truncated realization would definitely affect the
degree in which the other two are feasible.
The point, of course, is not only to avoid the top-down discussion and
replace it with addressing how ordinary people live secluded from “the law.”
Rather, the claim is to discuss how the presence of the law echoes in the ways
people manage themselves in these types of situations and how they feel about
their rights. As will be illustrated, the issue is not one of incompatibilities but
of subtle permeation of official and nonofficial forms of “rights.” The focus in
this discussion will therefore only be on some facets of civil and political rights
and less on the dimension of social rights or on the concept of citizenship per se.
The importance of such a perspective is, I think, that if we want to make
sense of currently changing conditions with regard to citizenship, including
the impacts of globalization; “the information society”; and the reactions to
current-day social movements’, politicians’, and international bodies’ insis-
tence on rights and political transparency, we need to deepen our comprehen-
sion of the previous trajectories the subjects embodying these changes went
through.16
The current literature will briefly be reviewed and commented upon. Subse-
quently, the presence of the absence of citizenship among the urban poor in
Latin America will be discussed, in two separate steps. First the focus will be
upon the specific contents—and deviations—of notions and practices with
regard to rights, entitlements, identities, liberties, and sovereignty, all crucial
terms in both classic and current theorizing on citizenship. Second, the
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presence, in spite of the apparent opposite, of classic and “canonical” criteria
of citizenship17 will be addressed, as these surface in common people’s views
and judgments about the deeds and misdeeds of politicians and state function-
aries—a presence, as will be illustrated, which is not translated into practices
in the encounters with these latter actors, but which functions as ethical and
normative standard informing evaluations and current learning processes. The
final section attempts to synthesize some of the findings.
THE PREDOMINANT FOCUS
ON “ABSENCE” OF CITIZENSHIP
In many publications on the insufficient bearing of the citizen, the demo-
cratic deficiencies of both old and regained democracies in Latin America
have been highlighted.18 Problems detected (and sometimes discussed in terms
of current efforts to overcome them) are the fragility of the regained and not-
yet consolidated democracies19 and the incapacity or unwillingness of political
institutions to represent societal interests, identities, and diversity.20 Others
have focused upon the lack of interaction and dialogue between society and
governments21 or the overideologized or, in recent times, overopportunistic
party specter.22 Also the extreme socioeconomic inequalities;23 the predomi-
nance of relational societies;24 and corruption, nepotism, and prebendalism25
have been highlighted. More recently, focuses have been upon the
technocratization of politics,26 the lack of state maneuvering due to neoliberal
impositions and globalization,27 the persisting predominance of authoritarian-
ism,28 the legacy of a culture of negation of the “other” as an explanation for the
failure of citizenship to materialize,29 the absence of a culture of rights,30 and
the neoliberal usurpation cum impoverishment of the citizenship concepts’
contents.31 All these features, it is argued, result in a crippled practice of
citizenship.
The bulk of the literature thus focuses upon the incompleteness of the pro-
cess of nation-building and the inadequacy and immaturity of democratic
practices. In this view Latin America, in many respects, is not (yet) “rational”;
its societies are not yet being based on the individual sovereignty, on equality
in the valorization of the individual, and on civic-normative cultures.32 These
societies are not (yet) “mature” enough to establish “decent” democracies, sta-
ble and ideologically consistent party systems, and impersonal bureaucratic
practices.
However, this whole tradition of dealing with the issues of democracy and
citizenship leads to analyses that tend to be teleological, normative, and
anthropologically poor.33 The focus mostly is upon the deficient
institutionality, highlighting its fragileness, its incapacity or reluctance to
apply the same rules to anybody, its lack of probity, and its vulnerability to a
logic of small-circle-loyalty instead of complying with a logic of common
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good.34 In other cases, analyses focus upon political culture, highlighting the
vices of authoritarianism, elitism, clientelism, nepotism, populism, corrup-
tion, and prebendalism, declaring all those cultural traits premodern. Espe-
cially in this latter tendency, political culture tends to be conceptualized as a
universe in which the democratic order “as it should function” is permanently
derailed by practices that corrupt it and rob it of its legitimacy and true demo-
cratic vocation. Culture, thus, appears as the obstacle, the phenomenon that
blocks the democracy from functioning as it should.
All this leads to the detection of a long list of deficiencies: to a scarce partic-
ipation, to a weak civil society in which the citizen is practically absent,35 to
political systems that are “irrational”36 and incorporate an “authoritarian
manipulative ingredient”37 or even are marked by an “engrained authoritarian
tradition . . . and an oligarchic configuration of politics in daily praxis.”38 At a
societal level, the deficiencies are that these are politically disarticulated,
hardly trust in or are interested in politics,39 are “abstentionalist and anti-
party,”40 and in alarming numbers incline to authoritarian rule.41
POLITICAL CULTURE AND CITIZENSHIP DOWN UNDER
The ways in which poor neighborhoods fight for the deliverance of urban
services reveal that a citizens rights discourse is rarely applied. This becomes
clear listening to both common shantytown settlers and their neighborhood
dirigentes. One can often hear the latter paying verbal tribute to the discourse
on rights, their entitlements as citizens and due obligations of governments
and municipalities. But as one learns about how they actually operate to obtain
benefits for their neighborhoods, it becomes clear that it is mere discourse. In
practically all cases concerning the acquisition of certain obras (works) for
their vicinity, hardly ever was the insistence on legal criteria, or on accredited
entitlements, a central part of the strategy. Rather, the story is about “asking for
help.” Neighborhood representatives go to the municipality, or its technical
and executive bodies, and try to obtain access to the person “who is in charge.”
To this person they explain the problem and ask for help. Most often, this per-
son attempts to duck the responsibility for a decision on the matter, and the rep-
resentatives’ quality, in such cases, lies in his ability to get access to the
“higher” level. Often neighborhood leaders would boast about their astuteness
in managing to “get through” to the people who really could take decisions
and/or warrant that the promises would actually be observed. In cases the
dirigentes failed to get the “works” done, they would most often explain this
failure in terms of “I couldn’t get to the guy who is really in charge” or “they
wouldn’t let me talk to the person who could take the decision.” All these nar-
ratives were in terms of access, friends, relations, and cogency, and hardly ever
did the vocabulary appear that refers to regulations and stipulations being
obeyed, to “rights being applied,” or to “norms being observed.”
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The gap between the rights discourse and ordinary peoples’ narratives of
how things work is even greater. In more than fifty interviews realized in Ecua-
dor and Chile in the years 1996 and 1997—which focused on neighborhood
organizations—informants hardly ever referred to impersonal rights. Barrio
histories, stories on organization, victories, vicissitudes of dealing with politi-
cians and on how certain things were accomplished, were always stories about
concrete people: leaders, local politicians, individuals who took initiatives or
knew the right people, intermediaries such as representatives of the church or
respected elderly. Reconstructions of how things were done, how the neigh-
borhood “got this far,” lacked major allusions to the law, to municipal rules and
edicts, and to the process of navigating through juridical formulations and its
mazes. Exceptions were neighborhoods that originally were land seizures. In
these cases, juridical stipulations and parameters were hinted at. However, in
telling the story about how things finally were settled, once again the role of
certain politicians and intermediaries came to the fore. The degree in which the
final agreement did or did not observe the law, or the squatters’ rights, or the
legislation, was never part of the account people gave. Thus, even in cases in
which the strife had an obvious juridical component, and in which the rights of
the squatters and of the landowner beyond doubt must have been part and par-
cel of the negotiations and final compromise, the average squatter did not
include the rights discourse in his or her tale about “how it went.”
Personal relations thus play a larger role than notions about rights as citi-
zens and inhabitants of the city. But in what ways, then, is the “traditional”
content of citizenship altered? The formulations used by the informants point
at two ways in which this occurs.
First, the “existence” of official and formal citizenship takes place in a uni-
verse that is not common people’s main life domain. References to the right of
free speech, of religious liberty, of association, or to the rights to access and to
representation in governmental bodies, and so forth, mean relatively little to
people whose first worries are the lack of stable income, precarious housing
and neighborhood conditions, school necessities for their children, and the ill-
mannered behavior of counter clerks needed to obtain, for instance, a birth cer-
tificate. The most acute feelings of anxiety and insecurity in daily life and the
most pressing problems are not those covered by the citizens rights tenets or
those debated over in constitutional reforms. Official citizens rights are a “big”
thing; people’s daily experiences take place in “small” dailyness.
This perception culminates in incidental and particular rather than funda-
mental or aggregate demands from “the system.” The wish for a more decent
functioning of present routines is much more close and relevant than the
abstract claim to “fully install” all legal rights. What people concretely want is
clemency in their particular case, decency from the part of the state’s counter
clerks, being listened to when they explain their problem, the freedom to
choose a cheaper alternative for the cloth prescribed for the school uniform,
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the absolving of their traffic ticket by an understanding police officer in case
they are not blamable, the abolition of the arbitrariness to cut an hour of their
work pay when they arrived three minutes late, and the like. Instead of striving
for the installment and application of their prerogatives as citizens, they look
for a more “understanding,” benevolent, and flexible treatment and the libera-
tion of the indiscriminations they daily have to cope with. Legalistic emphases
in talking about claimants’ rights do not meet people’s most stressing worries
and perceptions of their worries.
Second, an important aspect is the auto-exclusion from the domain of legal
regulations, formal ruling, and most public and political space. Given strong
traditions of elitism, of relatively low schooling levels for the majority, and of
the still strong remains of a hierarchical estate society, great majorities of the
Latin Americans consider politics; legislation; and the world of statutes, juris-
diction, procedural resolutions, regulations, and the whole of legal terminol-
ogy a hostile, inaccessible, and unfathomable world in which they are
illiterates. They, under normal circumstances, would not dare to dispute the
impositions of the personal in charge in that world. Vis-à-vis claims of anyone
referring to articles, clauses, and paragraphs with regard to a particular bureau-
cratic procedure—or right or restriction of a right—they would mostly remain
silent no matter how illogical or silly the claim would be. It simply is a “no-
enter” land, a domain of public rule impervious to “our sort of public.” Much
the same goes for politics. Rogelio expresses this auto-limitation, although he
also makes a point of the fact that “in principle” things ought to be different (as
will be elaborated in the next section):
Poor people . . . could make a difference and could influence things . . . if only
they had access, and were prepared . . . if one studies one would understand what
they from above are venting upon us all the time. (Rogelio, Quito, October 30,
1998)
Besides, as all too often expressed in informal conversations with Latin Amer-
icans, being considered a world of thieves and impostors, “politics” (and, for
that matter, the judiciary) also is considered a world where many dangers lurk
if one is not acquainted with the rules. Politicians (and lawyers), people feel,
are a sly race, and uninformed people should not get mixed up in their bicker-
ing if they do not want to get hurt. As a result, common people tend to stay out
of the domains where their rights are formulated and defended, and ought to be
protected. The places where their rights, as official rights, are at stake and
where they theoretically might find support for their complaints about actual
rightlessness, are exactly the places they feel they do not have a trespassing
permit.
This results in the felt obligation to leave in the hands of the politicians the
things they are least willing and able to do: legislate and participate in society
according to the laws agreed upon in Parliament. Talking about the evil of the
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need for personal relationships to get things done, and how to get rid of it,
Paquisha paradoxically transfers her proper responsibility immediately to the
politicians, and takes it in her stride to disqualify them. So does, very categori-
cally, Pía, whereas Octavio expresses some frustration but at the same time res-
ignation with regard to the politicians’ ways of “keeping people out.”
To change things, to get rid of these palanca—things . . . well, those in Congress
have to take the initiative . . . they are the padres de la patria [fathers of the
fatherland], as they say . . . but they themselves must act according to a sort of
“order” they should respect, one as well as the other . . . there are many bad
apples there too . . . meanwhile, all we can do is work hard and honestly.
(Paquisha, Quito, August 23, 1997)
Politicians . . . are born in a golden cradle and get buried in a golden coffin . . .
they are the rich . . . we have to settle our own stuff. (Pía, Santiago, November 23,
1996)
The ugly thing really is that they [politicians] are talking about us all the time
and about our country. But a common person does not know what is going on.
All they do is taking good care of themselves, but they let nobody in on what they
really are arranging. They have their own idiom, you know? (Octavio, La Paz,
April 2000)
All this results in specific modalities of promoting one’s interest, which often
do not concur with citizens’ legal and politically official modes. Instead of
recurring to forms such as formal interest representation in the municipal
councils, of having one’s demand brought to the attention through due applica-
tion forms or if necessary through parliamentary questions, or of forming civil
interest groups and the like, people often opt for informal, clientelistic, or,
more recently, at times mass media-centered forms to get their grievances
heard. They do not feel comfortable with legal and formal vocabularies and
protest channels, and they abstain from participating or expressing opinions in
such terms. Relations, patronazco, votes-negotiations, and loud, short-lived
media scandals have proved much more effective, and are things people feel
more familiarized with, than going the way of the formal anonymous defense
of rights.42 Often, such “detour” tactics result in partial or short-term solutions,
not in a more systematic attention for underprivileged neighborhoods or
deprived groups, nor in them being attended according to their citizens rights.
These two aspects result in a presence of citizenship in which prevail
particularism and ad hoc demands about rights application. Moreover, people
value passive, beneficiary rights-as-grants above active, participatory rights,
and auto-exclude themselves with regard to the deliberations on right formula-
tions and claims. At first sight, such qualities deny the very essence of the idea
of citizens rights. But at a closer look, they reveal how people manage apocry-
phal fragments of something they cannot have entirely, or “the ambiguity and
indeterminateness of practices and representations manufactured out of the
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subtle combinations of past and present values, experiences, doubts, and peo-
ples’ fears and expectations.”43 Demands and wishes do not reflect the final
goal or “the whole thing” but the pieces within image-reach. They express the
sensation of the insufficient public visibility of the status of citizens in the
realm of experiences, in relation to the legal rationality of these societies.44
This “legal rationality” is not completely absent from the assessment of reality,
as will be argued below. But to get about, this standard is rather irrelevant. This
is expressed by Pedro, and sarcastically commented upon by Armando (in his
case with regard to performing bureaucratic obligations):
We of course hold on to it that we have the same rights as citizens as the rich . . .
but in actual fact they have privileges . . . when they approach the authorities . . .
well, they are the señores and we . . . let’s just say that they [the authorities] see us
on a little lower level. (Pedro, Quito, September 9, 1996)
What is the use of arguing with him [the state employee]? If he is in a bad mood,
he won’t help you anyway. You can only hope he had good sex that morning with
his wife, so that he is in a good mood. Then he might help you. But it is no use to
argue, that’s for sure. (Armando, La Paz, April 2000)
The lack of references to the universe of established rights and to the due obli-
gations of the state and its employees is even more remarkable, as illustrates
Armando, when nonpolitical, ordinary encounters and affairs such as bureau-
cratic formalities are the theme of the narrative. People often meet with slight;
poor infrastructure; hours-long waiting; and peevish, arrogant, and fickle em-
ployees, and because of this, paradoxically, give more importance to relations
than to arguments about how rights ought to be complied with. This suggests
that the perception of rights being violated is not a thing discursively present
all the time but rather a latent evaluation pattern. People object, but this objec-
tion is not put to action. This mixture of latent negative judgment and daily
coping is expressed by María:
The rich have their palancas at all places, they have their friends everywhere—
they get out quickly [of official buildings and offices], whereas we don’t have
these friendships . . . for us it takes long, you have to queue, they send you from
one place to the other . . . you just have to have patience. (María, Quito, Septem-
ber 24, 1996)
Here, to get your taxi-permit renewed, it really is a calvario. They let you wait
for hours, and always say some document is not in order. That whole thing there,
at Transito [traffic police offices], is a chaos. Often, you only leave after having
paid at least 20 Bolivianos . . . or more. (La Paz taxi driver, January 2000)
In daily doing, then, people do not turn to a proactive claim of citizenship stan-
dards and concomitant rights and express almost resignation with regard to
how things for them transpire. The word almost is necessary: it is not that peo-
ple are not aware of the “wrong” (as will be elaborated below), but the thing is
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that they see absolutely no point in protesting recurring to “their right.” In daily
interaction, such behavior would not only produce derision or irritation among
the ones who are denying decent, appropriate treatment, but also wonder
among those who share the protestor’s lot. It is an unrealistic, atypical
resource, and does not form part of the normal defense repertoire against the
insecurity and capriciousness that besets them.
Consequently, the inability to claim rights is not easily undone by inserting
knowledge about these rights. The daily reproductions of relations that contra-
dict individuals’ (citizens’) equality resist fast refashioning. They are not only
continuously reconfirmed by how the institutions and politics work but are
also deeply embedded in people’s reactions and responses. People’s action, in
the words of Lois McNay, entails “entrenched dimensions of embodied expe-
riences that might escape processes of reflexive self monitoring.” In the view
of McNay, it is crucial to understand such identities (in her case gender identi-
ties) not as the result of a “relatively straightforward and one-sided process of
inculcation and normalisation” but as both a “relation of conditioning” as well
as of a “relation of ‘cognitive construction’ whereby habitus is constitutive of
the field in that it endows the latter with meaning, with ‘sense and value,’ in
which it is worth investing one’s energy.”45 This Bourdieu-inspired vocabu-
lary, if we apply it to poor urban Latin Americans’ citizen identities, reveals
that not a mere repression of citizen awareness or a “reparable” lack of con-
sciousness is at stake, but that, rather, a creative and at times clever exploitation
of predominant features combines with abstaining from the demand to be
treated, formally, “righteously.”
Often, these clerks are badly prepared for their job. They work there because
they know the boss, that’s all. Sometimes you can take advantage of them. For
instance, you say that the other week you arranged the same matter with the
same papers at hand. If you’re lucky, they believe you. (Militón, La Paz, March
2000)
HOW IT OUGHT TO BE:
HOW UNWORKABLE STANDARDS WORK
Latin American urban poor manage their own, apocryphal contents and pri-
orities with regard to practicing citizenship. At the same time, however, as
already alluded to in the previous section, notions about rights that do reflect
the creed of official citizens prerogatives are not completely lacking in their
images. Most people are well aware of how they should be treated as citizens,
of how politicians and government functionaries ought to behave, and of how
institutions must be run. The presence of notions of due politics, due
institutionality, and due citizenship thus turns out a little more than just formal
or abstract. Latin American societies, it seems, operate “at the juncture of a
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system composed of ideal norms and a legitimising system of social practices
based on personal relations.”46 The “ideal norms” are not completely inactive.
With regard to the issue of clientelism and the corresponding views on politics
and politicians, the point is well illustrated by Burgwal.47 He argues, referring
to the practices in a Quitenean squatter settlement, that many dwellers in a way
accept the rules of the clientelistic game, and might in their explanations refer
to the logic of give and take (give electoral support, take/receive benefits for
their neighborhood), and to the image of a generous politician that deserves
gratitude. They will, in their encounters with such politicians, even treat these
with deference and stress the politicians’ power of disposal and their own
dependency and role as recipients. Nevertheless, underneath the verbal sub-
mission, criteria crop up about what is correct. It is clearly, although not
always explicitly, expressed that, for instance, existing patronazco relations
should not be patronizing or work out as narrow collusions; and more in gen-
eral, criteria to distinguish good and bad politicians surface.48 In these criteria
about good politicians, it is stressed that these politicians should be indifferent
toward whom they are helping (they should focus upon the common good
without considering friends, foes, and clans), and their plainness and sensitiv-
ity toward the needs of the poor are particularly valued. The not narrowly parti-
san politician, frank and honest, competent and not sectarian, who serves
others rather than himself, in other words, the politician supposed to be
prototypical for the “consolidated and mature democracy,” thus emerges as the
model politician the urban poor dream of. The rejection of the practices of
arbitrary clientelism also becomes present when this politician fails to deliver.
In such cases, the shantytown dwellers might recur to open protest and even
insults toward politicians, accusing them of exactly those things that in the first
instance were the vehicles of the clientelist negotiating: particularism, unreli-
ability, “payola-politics,” and unscrupulous maneuvering and politicking.
Hence, not only latent awareness, but also practices that recur to notions of
rights and correct politics, are at times present, simultaneously with concepts
that reflect acceptation of and adaptation to routines that invalidate these
notions. Identities with regard to citizenship are multifarious. They include
both practices apparently revealing a lack of awareness of rights and of the
notions about the correct appliance of these rights in a constitutional
democracy, and a presence of cognizance about how things ought to be.
In a sort of “negative dialectics,” the arguments with which the lack of
decent treatment and the revolting behavior of politicians in the view of the
poor are indicted reveal the not often directly articulated criteria that according
to them ought to govern.
Of course we have the same right to give our opinion! It’s just that they don’t lis-
ten to us. (Luciano, Quito, October 30, 1998)
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Often there are people in there that are not at all prepared for the job. I personally
feel that when they get in there they should give them a course in “human rela-
tions,” because most of them don’t know about that or don’t apply it. You get into
this office, and the secretary is polishing her nails, talking with the other secre-
tary, o taking a coffee—and the people are waiting there in long queues. So one
says: “señorita, please” . . . so it gets to the point when someone gets angry and
says: “why don’t you do what you are supposed to do, and attend these people?”
So she says: “because I don’t feel like it, or this is my break” and her break really
is all day long. And if the jefe [the superior] comes in, and he put her there, even
worse it gets. He shakes hands with her and gets out again . . . or the superior
comes in and they write three or four letters on the computer and . . . over and
out! That really is one easy thing that could be done in this country: that every-
body working there would be prepared and willing to work. If we could only do
that, we wouldn’t be the way we are. (Leonidas, Quito, September 4, 1997)
People are aware that they should be treated otherwise, that they, officially,
have the right to complain about arbitrariness and rudeness, that they have the
right to express their anger. People, in a way think with citizen rights.
Things are really bad here. Nothing works. Not even the traffic lights. And “up
there” they steal and lie, nothing else. And there is nothing to be done about it.
What we need is decent and honest politicians, that do something for this coun-
try. Why don’t some of your country come and help us out here? (Taxi driver, La
Paz, May 2000)
However, this rights cognizance is not applied as an instrument to solicit one’s
right in concrete situations; it is present more as an image than as a practical
tool. This ambiguity can help explain why the notion of rights is welcomed and
referred to in stories about (experiences with) politicians and state bureaucracy
and, at the same time, is left behind in concrete encounters.49 To recognize or
denounce (but never vis-à-vis state officials!) events of not being attended, or
not being attended properly, or being treated badly, or being “abandoned” by
politics, the notion of citizenship works for people. However, in concrete situa-
tions, they tend to fill in the idea with much more bare notions such as the wish
to be lucky and be (correctly) attended in a particular case, and to receive fair
and “delivering” treatment, irrespective of its “equality” quality. People, in
this way, reproduce the ambiguity and interrelatedness of un-citizen-like
practices and citizens’ consciousness.
“There is . . . an apparently strong and very ‘Western’ support for a liberal
concept of political and bureaucratic probity, and this in turn seemed to be
closely linked to a modern and liberal concept of citizenship rights.”50 Citizen-
ship acquires not only a specific stature in the sense that it works more as a
moral code than as a practical wedge to open up state institutions or gain access
to decisions on policies and to obtain efficient reply at state offices, but also in
the sense that in make-do life it is fleshed out with exactly those qualities most
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intensely felt as missing in contacts with politics and institutions in the day-to-
day circumstances.
Really, in real life they screw you all the time . . . if you’re not dressed up, they
simply ignore you . . . if you don’t have the money, they simply dismiss you.
(Luciano, Quito, October 30, 1998)
Why can’t they simply say: “this is what you need,” and you get that and have it
over with. But instead they think of something else every time you get there . . .
just bugging you. (Taxi driver, La Paz, December 1999)
Whereas, on one hand, in concrete evaluations and considerations around poli-
tics, people “are not interested in ideology, ideas, principles, methods and ob-
jectives, but (only) in realizations,” on the other hand, there is enormous trust
in the law.51 The law represents order and due organization of things; it repre-
sents “the same rule for everybody” and embodies the promise of deliverance
if the applicant complies with the (bureaucratic) prerequisites. Politicians and
people with power do not go by the law, and that is exactly the problem.52 A
self-identifying mechanism often observed among rank-and-file Latin Ameri-
cans is that of grouping oneself with “the decent people.” Poverty, unemploy-
ment, a shack for a house, all these things might apply to these people. None-
theless the criterion of decency remains upheld. Decent are those that obey the
elementary rules of coexistence with others: do not steal, do not lie, do not be
pretentious, do not cheat others, respect others. This attitude obtains extra sig-
nificance in the light of the fact that most people agree that their country does
not live up to these virtues. In a way, they set the example: if everybody, espe-
cially politicians and state representatives, would behave as decently as they,
the rank and file, do, their country would not be such a mess.
Our people are so credulous . . . they let themselves being cheated time and
again. They [politicians], talk so nicely, and have such a nice face, so the people
say: “all right, let’s forgive him what he’s done before.” It looks as if the people
are too meek, they fall again and again . . . always for the same guys, that this
time seem to have bettered themselves. So the people say: “this one, let’s see
what he will realise this time” . . . We Ecuadorians are too understanding . . . but a
good thing is that we [the poor] are often solidary, although not all . . . but the
majority is willing to help the other guy, they smile towards the other, and are at
his service. (Leonidas, Quito, September 4, 1997)
A double scenario is at work, in which, nevertheless, the standard of decency is
not given up. Both in explaining and excusing their own maneuvering as well
as in judging others’ behavior, the model is alive of a decent society, where
rights are respected, dignity is endowed to all, and probity guides human inter-
action. People know about rights and citizens’entitlements. They think with it.
But it would be folly on their part to try to employ these rights in real life.
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BY WAY OF CONCLUSION
In a burlesque tone, Escalante, speaking of Mexico, mocks the obtuse
citizen:
The citizen goes about applying little logic and with an awkward lack of practi-
cal sense. For instance, everybody knows that it is much better for our health and
peacefulness of mind to simply pay the payola to whomever is entitled, and forget
about the thing as soon as possible. The citizen, however, either simply doesn’t
know, or pretends not to know, and once he gets into it, he doesn’t pay neither
forgets about it, neither lives on peacefully, neither allows the others to do so; he
can take months in complaints and denunciations, writing letters and accusa-
tions . . . ; (really) one needs a good nose to distinguish him from the lout or sim-
ple idiot.53
In his parody, Escalante goes as far as to call him a pain in the neck for not
smoothly going by the rules of the game. He is probably right, in the sense that
most Latin Americans do not insist on probity, politeness, and efficiency in
daily dealing with state dependencies and politics. To do otherwise would be
unproductive and would most likely evoke advice from others to do otherwise
and, in case of insistence, their repulse.
What people make of citizenship in cases when the sociocultural founda-
tions for the existence of its classical orthodoxy do not apply is something apt
for the circumstances. It looks as if, first and for all, people appreciate being
attended. Rights, in their conception, refer less to their access to participation,
proactive action, initiative to intervene, or personal lifestyle freedom but to
their entitlement, interpreted as a particular, not universal, thing to be
addressed properly by the state and by the state’s policies. “Rights” thus refer
to the “delivering,” honorable, and decent operation of the practices embody-
ing their dependence on higher powers, the state in the first place.54 The right to
have a say, to get elected, to join in deliberations about policies, is less a worry
than is the right to get something. A passive contents of citizenship predomi-
nates over one in which the “sovereign individual” rules. Citizenship is more
about being treated than about acting. And it is more about people’s attitudes
than about societal structures and legislation.55 This translates into an empha-
sis on being beneficiaries more than on being bequeathed access to active
involvement and membership in societal institutions and political bodies. Citi-
zenship is associated less with formal equality in the right to partake than with
concretely being considered in measures taken, benefits being distributed, and
bureaucratic formalities being dispatched.
This indifference regarding the active participation as part and parcel of
“mature citizenship” (a great worry for Jelín and for Calderón and
Zmuckler56), in the “collective will” to help the country forward, probably ech-
oes the feelings of being incompetent in the joint endeavor “of the country,”
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and this in turn echoes the lifelong history of effective exclusion. For many
Latin Americans, “legislation” is done elsewhere.
But to overcome the vocabulary of “absence” or insufficiency of citizen-
ship, it is crucial to highlight the way these experiences are transformed into
practices, resignifications, and strategies that enable people to move ahead and
become agents in an engraved civil-agency-unfriendly culture. Latin Ameri-
cans’ focus upon favors and benefits does not stand for passivity or “absence”
but for active, creative, and flexible handling of citizen-adverse conditions.
Simultaneously, the notion of due citizenship is present and used in assess-
ing experiences. In such assessments, institutions’functioning and politicians’
behavior fall short of the standard. The standard, in turn, interlinks with prac-
tices that reveal a self-restricting, dependent, public-space-avoiding citizen,
who is, however, at the same time, cunning in managing the conditions under
which his citizenship is allowed to be.
In recent decades, sociopolitical circumstances in Latin America have
undergone dramatic changes. The scant welfare structure crumbled under the
restructuring measures, and the obligation of the state “to take care” evapo-
rated from political discourses.57 On the other hand, global discourses on trans-
parency and good governance, and the rejection of the history of authori-
tarianism, gained in strength. They match with an increasing critique on the
flaws of existing democratic structures, and with a reorientation of the tradi-
tional Left attributing democracy and citizenship unprecedented vigor. All this
has given the idea of citizenship central stage in current Latin American politi-
cal contestation. However, if we hope to understand the ways in which com-
mon Latin Americans will react to these changing political parameters, we
first of all need to comprehend what they used to make of citizenship given the
past trajectories of their countries.
1. Bureaucracies are notorious for absurdity all over the globe. Nevertheless, there is a difference: in
Western Europe and North America, bizarre anecdotes are recognized as bizarre and illustrative for how
obnoxious large administrative apparatuses can get. In Latin America, as I was once told, “Kafka would
never have drawn so much attention.” In other words, the incredible stories are much more common and are
met with much more stoicism.
2. Sergio Ramirez, “Vigores disperses (Centroamérica: los retos pendientes de la construcción
democrática),” Working Papers Series: Issues in Culture, Democracy and Development 2 (College Park:
Latin American Studies Center, University of Maryland, 1999), 8; Julio Echeverría, “La democracia
enfrentada a la complejidad,” in Ecuador Debate 42 (Quito: CAAP, 1997), 74-82, at 77.
3. Renato Rosaldo, “Cultural Citizenship, Inequality and Multiculturalism,” in Rodolfo D. Torres,
Louis F. Mirón, and Jonathan Xavier Inda, eds., Race, Identity and Citizenship (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999),
253-61, at 259. Cf. Ignacio T. Abello, “Identidad y diferencia,” in Abello T. Ignacio, Sergio de Zubiría, and
Silvio Sánchez, eds., Cultura: teorías y gestión (San Juan de Pasto, Colombia: Ediciones Unariño, 1998),
104-33; Sergio de Zubiría Samper, ”Momentos de la identidad cultural latinoamericana/Identidades
modernas y posmodernas en Latinoamérica,” in Cultura: teorías y gestión, 134-73.
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4. Speaking of “Latin America” as a whole bears great risks. Although I maintain that my argument
does apply to Latin America in a general sense, I am aware that differences exist and that, moreover, things
are not static: in many Latin American countries, struggles for “fuller” citizenship mark present political
contestation.
5. In a very interesting article, Engelke discusses the “moral sentiments” involved in perceptions of
human rights. He addresses the broad rejection of homosexuality as being “un-African” in Zimbabwe and
the resistance against the argument of the human right to sexual preference as an illustration of the futility of
insisting on the purely legal discourse. In the words of one of the spokespersons of the adversaries, in defi-
ance of the advocates of the human rights argument, “We wondered what human rights he was talking
about.” Although in another context, and dealing with another problematic, the case illustrates that “human
rights talk rarely means the same thing in different places” (p. 291). The same goes, I argue, for citizenship.
Matthew Engelke, “ ‘We Wondered What Human Rights He Was Talking About’: Human Rights, Homosex-
uality and the Zimbabwe International Book Fair,” Critique of Anthropology 19, no. 3 (1999): 289-314.
6. The classical triad Marshall left us. We will return to this legacy below. T. H. Marshall, Class, Citi-
zenship and Social Development (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1965).
7. Marshall, Class, Citizenship and Social Development; see M. Bulmer and Anthony M. Rees, eds.,
Citizenship Today: The Contemporary Relevance of T.H. Marshall (London: UCL Press, 1996).
8. Marshall, Class, Citizenship and Social Development; Bulmer and Rees, Citizenship Today.
9. This “fourth generation” of rights is the one that refers to collective rights and is one of the main
issues in current indigenous demands toward the state. They cover group rights within a greater society. As
such, they unsettle the groundwork of the classical rights, since these are fundamentally individual rights. In
this respect, they have a lot in common with my present ambition: to multiply our concept of citizens’ rights
(cf. Will Kymlicka, Ciudadanía multicultural [Barcelona: Ediciones Paidós, 1996]; Willem Assies, Gemma
van der Haar, and André Hoekema, “Diversity as a Challenge: A Note on the Dilemmas of Diversity,” in
Willem Assies, Gemma van der Haar, and André Hoekema, eds., The Challenge of Diversity: Indigenous
Peoples and Reform of the State in Latin America [Amsterdam: Thesis, 2000]; Donna Lee Van Cott, The
Friendly Liquidation of the Past: The Politics of Diversity in Latin America [Pittsburgh: University of Pitts-
burgh Press, 2000]; and Joseph H. Carens, Culture, Citizenship and Community—A Contextual Exploration
of Justice as Evenhandedness [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000]). However, since the debate on col-
lective rights is a very broad and extensive one, and emphasizes different aspects, I leave it out in the present
text.
10. Andrés Pérez Baltodano, “Estado, ciudadanía y política social: una caracterización del desarrollo de
las relaciones entre Estado y sociedad en América Latina,” in Andrés Pérez Baltodano, ed., Globalización,
ciudadanía y política social en América Latina: tensiones y contradicciones (Caracas: Nueva Sociedad,
1997), 31-66.
11. Roberto Da Matta, “The Quest for Citizenship in a Relational Universe,” in John B. Wirth, Edson de
Oliveira Nunes, and Thomas E. Bogenschild, eds., State and Society in Brazil—Continuity and Change
(Boulder: Westview, 1987), 307-35; Guillermo O’Donnel, Counterpoints—Selected Essays on Authoritari-
anism and Democratization (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999), 81 ff.; and cf. Lucy
Taylor, Citizenship, Participation and Democracy: Changing Dynamics in Chile and Argentina (London:
Macmillan, 1998), 3.
12. To be sure, this state functionary very often is also a poorer citizen. But the fact that he or she will
often suffer bad treatment as well does not change the logic, in which arbitrariness prevails over procedures,
because particularism rules in either case.
13. That is an unprecise denomination. I suspect that the problematic with regard to citizenship affects
the whole of Latin American societies, but in varying degrees and manifestations (cf. O’Donnel, Counter-
points). However, since I did research among urban poor in Quito, La Paz, and Santiago, I restrict my analy-
sis to those sectors. They are the shantytown dwellers, sometimes immigrants, often majorities in the larger
cities but underrepresented in political spheres. They are the subject of my interpretation, but I think it safe to
extend most of what I state to, in general, the lower and lower-middle classes in Latin America, and will
suggest so in the text.
14. This article is based on fieldwork information obtained in Chile in the years 1989 to 1998 and in
Ecuador in the years 1996 to 1999. Additionally, it is based on a series of conversations with “ordinary and
poor Bolivians” in the city of La Paz, such as market sellers, street shoe repairers, empleadas and their fami-
lies, and taxi drivers in the years 1997 to 2000.
15. Marshall, Class, Citizenship and Social Development.
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of Neoliberalism in Latin America,” in Julia Buxton and Nicola Phillips, eds., Developments in Latin Ameri-
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